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SUBJECT:

- 1. The attached papers constitute guidance for the way I'd like to have the worldwide briefing further developed.
- We want to be ready for me to do it or for Bob Gates to do it. That decision remains to be made. When I return from my trip, I hope a draft revised along these lines will be ready for me.
- I am thinking of trying this year as a single presentation with a smaller group than we usually have to handle the difficult questions that might come up.
- I would like to give it on an unclassified level, particularly since we have already given the strategic assessment and other information on that level.
- 5. The attached sheet, headed "1986 Worldwide Briefing," will indicate the broad concept I want the briefing to reflect.
- 6. The next document, headed "Guidance for Worldwide Briefing," is a quick and dirty draft of how I would like to see it developed. I am asking to fill this out with some information he has collected for me and then I would like each of you to prepare an insert or make adaptations in your material along the lines I have suggested.
- I would like Larry Gershwin to scale down the strategic forces material and relate it to the other elements of the threat in a way that the guidance document suggests at the beginning of the second page. The elements which I'd like Graham and Charlie to contribute are indicated on page 4 of the guidance document.
- The next document, "Further Work on the Worldwide Briefing," indicates additional ideas to be incorporated along with the talking points I used to develop the nature of the threat and the links to Cuba and the Soviet Union and how they are being hooked up in my presentation to the NSC on Central America.
- I attach also the earlier drafts of the presentation on strategic forces, on subversive aggression, and on terrorism.

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cc: DDCI

SECRET

DCI 14 Jan 86

SUBJECT: 1986 Worldwide Briefing

I want the worldwide briefing to be built around the interrelations between three elements of the threat we face and the requirements and choices we have in coping with them. Instead of reeling off these threats separately, we ought to try to interrelate them.

I have in mind the military threat as the backdrop for the other two. This includes the projected strategic buildup and the conventional capabilities based in the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact themselves.

The second is the building of bases, linking them up, and developing and threatening additional positions around the world. This would involve extending the style of my talking points for the NSPG on Central America to other complexes around the world, i.e., Libya, Ethiopia, Camranh Bay, etc.

The third is the remarkable leverage small countries like Libya, North Korea, Syria, Cuba, and Iran have against larger countries to immobilize them and influence their policies. Examples are Egypt, Sudan, South Africa, and Europe and the United States as well. These are not necessarily Soviet surrogates, but they pursue complementary aims and contribute to the overall threat.

The first draft of the worldwide briefing touched on all three of these things but did not interrelate them and could be put in better focus and proportion.

